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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
To have what counsel believed was a well-founded, 
fully documented appeal declared frivolous was a shock• The 
Court's opinion makes short shrift of appellant's arguments and 
statement of the case and ignores what appellant believed to be 
a clear error of law. 
A short analysis of the Court's opinion and comparison 
with the issues as appellant believed they were presented is 
made under a separate heading for the reason that the tone of 
the Court's opinion is such that this analysis may be considered 
by the Court to be a waste of time. 
Appellant petitions the Court to reconsider and rehear 
appellant's position that the Judgment rendered in favor of the 
defendant against the appellant in the amount of $12,500 is 
excessive and contrary to the evidence and the findings of fact. 
This is one of the arguments which the Court's footnote disposes 
of by stating, 
These arguments clearly lack merit and do 
not warrant discussion in this opinion. 
This matter was addressed at pages 26-28 of 
appellant's Brief and mentioned briefly at pages 6, 12 and 24 of 
respondent's Brief with no explanation or justification of an 
amount of $12,500 as against the amount of $5,996 which was 
expended by the defendant on improvements to appellant's home, 
some of which added no value to the home. 
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This matter was brought to the attention of the trial 
court in plaintiff's Memorandum of January 5, 1988 (R. 164-189) 
as Point I in that Memorandum. 
It is true that the main thrust of plaintiff's appeal 
was the failure to distinguish between equities arising during 
a period prior to cohabitation, during cohabitation, and after 
marriage. In reference to these matters, appellant's Brief 
states at page 26: 
But if plaintiff is wrong on both of the 
foregoing points, the judgment of the trial 
court still must be reversed because it is 
not supported by the evidence. 
An analysis of the evidence and of the findings is then made 
which are herein stated. 
The Second Amended Findings of Fact (R. 285 at 
288-289) include Findings 12e, f, g, h and i in the following 
language: 
e. Defendant, with plaintiff and 
plaintiff's sons' assistance doing much of 
the work, paid for the finishing of three 
rooms and partial bath in the basement of 
the home at a cash cost of $4,496.00. 
f. After the three rooms were 
finished, defendant's son Corey lived in 
one of those rooms, also his son Michael 
did so part of the time and in the summer 
months, the other three children of the 
defendant lived in the said rooms part of 
the time. 
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g. Defendant without plaintiff's 
objection caused a patio to be added at a 
cost of $650.00 for the kit, with the help 
of plaintiff and plaintiff's sons, which 
added a value of $1,500.00 to the appraisal 
of the home. 
h. Defendant without objection by 
plaintiff replaced a portion of the fence 
at a cost of $350.00, which added nothing 
to the appraised value of the home. 
i. Defendant without objection by 
plaintiff replaced some shrubs and trees at 
a cost of $500.00, which added nothing to 
the appraised value of the home. 
This same document, originally dated August 19, 1988 
and signed by the Court October 4, 1988, included the following 
conclusions of law: 
6. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay 
the defendant $7,500.00 for improvements 
made in the basement of the home during the 
time the parties lived together prior to 
marriage. 
7. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay 
to the defendant $5,000.00 for improvements 
made to the property at 5999 Monaco Circle 
prior to marriage or during marriage, 
consisting of the deck, the replacement of 
a portion of the fence and replanting 
portions of the landscaping. 
Since there is no explanation in the record of the 
jump in figures from the cash investment to the amount of the 
judgment against the appellant, who will have to sell her home 
to pay the judgment, the Court should either amend the judgment 
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or remand the case for evidence as to why the incongruity 
between the findings, conclusions and judgment exists. 
There cannot be much doubt that the judgment must be 
supported by the findings of fact and that the conclusions of 
law are entitled to no particular deference and will only be 
reviewed for correctness in light of the findings of fact. 
Western Kane County District v. Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 
1376 at 1377-1378 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1987); Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1985); Stewart v. Coffman, 748 
P.2d 579, 580-581 (Utah App. 1988). 
DISAGREEMENT WITH THE COURTIS STATEMENTS 
The Court's opinion, appellant submits, does not 
distinguish between the relationship between the parties before 
the defendant moved into plaintiff's home, the situation which 
existed while they were living together and while defendant's 
children were utilizing the improvements made in the basement, 
and the period of their short-lived marriage. Before the trial 
court plaintiff took the position that there was a difference in 
consequences depending on during which of those three periods 
the event occurred. There was never a challenge to the right of 
the Court to make a disposition of property including premarital 
or separate property and the trial court never recognized any 
distinction. 
-7-
This Court's opinion gives the impression that when 
gifts are made prior to cohabitation, more gifts are made and 
improvements to the plaintiff's separate property are made 
during cohabitation and those and occurrences during the 
marriage are all lumped together without any distinction. The 
opinion does not quite say that, but definitely gives that 
impression. This was the plaintiff's experience with the trial 
court. It was never stated by the Court that there is no 
distinction between consequences during cohabitation and during 
marriage, and yet no distinction was ever recognized. The Court 
cites Layton vs. Layton, 77 P.2d 504, and Mattes vs. Olearain, 
79 P. 2d 1177, which were cited by the plaintiff, as 
distinguishing between distribution of the property of unmarried 
cohabitants and distribution in divorce actions. The Court goes 
on to suggest, although it does not precisely say so, that if 
cohabitants later marry, the distinction is erased. The 
appellant cited cases where cohabitation was followed by 
marriage and where the distinction was not erased. Jorgensen v. 
Joraensen, 667 P. 2d 22 (Utah 1983); Crouch v. Crouch, 88 
Ill.App.3d 426, 410 N.E.2d 580; Feliciano v. Roseman Silver Co. , 
514 N.E.2d 1095 (Mass. 1987). 
The Supreme Court has divided separate property of one 
spouse only upon a special showing. Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 
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133, 135 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1987); Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 
(Utah 1982). 
No special showing was made in this case and this 
Court finds none and ignores these precedents. 
At appellant's first divorce, she was given a 
completely furnished and landscaped home, adequate for herself 
and her children, together with alimony and support money and 
she had earnings from occasional employment. During 
cohabitation she continued to receive alimony and support money 
and gave the defendant the benefit of a fine home with a small 
mortgage and a low interest rate. Defendant knew appellant had 
not worked and was not expected to work and cannot complain that 
the balance of support for himself and the appellant was his 
burden. 
The District Court with Judge Dee presiding, awarded* 
temporary alimony, which was never paid by the defendant. 
Appellant was forced to find work and no bills incurred after 
the separation (except mortgage payments) were paid by the 
defendant. 
At the divorce the home was awarded to the plaintiff 
but with a judgment against her in the amount of $12,500, which, 
it is submitted, she has no means of paying without selling the 
home. This Court has frequently held that a division of 
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property will be examined to determine if it is equitable as to 
the parties and leaves them able to enjoy substantially the 
standard of living they enjoyed previously (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 33-38). Appellant requested this review by the Court and it 
was not given in the opinion. Appellant filed a Motion to 
Reopen to present financial evidence to aid the Court in this 
type of determination (R. 62-65); the motion was first granted 
and later refused (R. 266-267) and this Court has affirmed that 
refusal. 
In the matter of cohabitation by the appellant with 
one Joseph Garcia, it is true that the appellant admitted that 
Joseph Garcia moved in with her in December 1986 when she was 
receiving no support money from the defendant and was working at 
low wages. It is not the fact of cohabitation which the 
appellant argued but the time of it. Prior to December 
appellant and Joseph Garcia had been friends and he had stayed 
in her home some nights but had never lived there, for the 
meaning of which appellant looked to this Court's decision in 
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). These facts are set 
out in appellant's Brief at pages 30-3 3. 
Judge Dee awarded temporary alimony and gave a 
judgment for temporary alimony in March 1985, with no suggestion 
of termination at that time. Fixing the date thereafter was the 
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purpose of appellant's motion for new trial (R. 140, 142-143, 
150-163) giving evidence from other persons, some of them 
definitely not interested persons, bearing on the date that 
Joseph Garcia moved into the home at Monaco Circle. The 
testimony of Kounalis is analyzed at pages 11-12, 18-19, 30-31 
of appellant's Brief. It was general, referred only to the 
coming and going of Joseph Garcia (Finding 24), and nothing to 
indicate that he was anything but a friend with limited 
privileges. Why was this question examined and the requirements 
analyzed in Haddow v. Haddow and not in this case? 
The divorce was granted in March 1985 with a judgment 
for temporary alimony to that date. Finding 25 says: 
* * * After the parties separation in 1983 
and Divorce in 1985, plaintiff began to 
cohabit with Joe Garcia * * * 
It is admitted that it was "after" those dates and fixing the 
date was important. The plaintiff, her sons and Joseph Garcia 
testified that moving in and living in occurred in December 1986 
(Tr. 57, 26-28, 176-177, 189-190) There is no other fixing of 
a date. Because of the absence of impartial evidence that it 
was not before December 1986, plaintiff filed a motion for 
partial new trial supported by affidavit of neighbor, sister, 
and friends of Joseph Garcia including a former girl friend (R. 
140, 142-143, 150-163). 
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Appellant submits that these distinctions in relation-
ships are meaningful in the law. Cohabitation without marriage 
has become common and the distinction between living together 
and marriage has been preserved by most courts. Some cases rely 
on an agreement made between the parties; some rely on 
compensation for services rendered; and none that we have found 
simply put the parties at risk. 
Appellant's counsel submits that his efforts to obtain 
a decision distinguishing between these various relationships is 
not frivolous but is important. 
If the Court's holding that this is a frivolous appeal 
is based on the belief that it was filed for an extension of 
time, it is ironic. During the entire trial plaintiff was 
battling against time to bring the matter to a conclusion and 
the delays were on the part of the other side. A cash bond has 
been posted to protect the defendant. The judgment is bearing 
twelve percent interest and there is only disadvantage to the 
appellant in this appeal and in this Petition. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P . C . 
RICHARD L BIRD, JR 
By: 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that this Petition is not filed for 
delay, but in the good faith belief and opinion that defendant's 
judgment should be reduced and that the Court should reconsider 
the denial of other relief to the appellant. 
RICHARD L BIRD, JR 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was served on the defendant-respondent this 29th day 
of May, 1990, by mailing a true and correct copy thereof via 
United States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Connie L. 
Mower, Esquire, 623 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
RICHARD L BIRD, JR 
